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1.0 Introduction 
This Hazard Analysis document encompasses the Mark III Space Suit Assembly (SSA) 
and associated ancillary equipment.  It has been prepared using JSC17773, "Preparing 
Hazard Analyses for JSC Ground Operation", as a guide. 
2.0 Purpose 
The purpose of this document is to present the potential hazards involved in ground (23 
% maximum O2, One-g) operations of the Mark III and associated ancillary support 
equipment system.  The hazards listed in this document are specific to suit operations 
only; each supporting facility (Bldg. 9, etc.) is responsible for test specific Hazard 
Analyses.  A "hazard" is defined as any condition that has the potential for harming 
personnel or equipment. 
3.0 Scope 
This analysis was performed to document the safety aspects associated with manned 
use of the Mark III for pressurized and unpressurized ambient, ground-based,  One-g 
human testing.  The hazards identified herein represent generic hazards inherent to all 
standard JSC test venues for nominal ground test configurations.  Non-standard test 
venues or test specific configurations may warrant consideration of additional hazards 
analysis prior to test. The cognizant suit engineer is responsible for the safety of the 
astronaut/test subject, space suit, and suit support personnel.  The test requester, for 
the test supported by the suit test engineer and suited subject, is responsible for overall 
safety and any necessary Test Readiness Reviews (TRR). 
For the purpose of the baseline document the following information was used: 
 
 Test personnel are available and trained to extract the test subject in the event of 
an emergency. 
 This Hazard Analysis is restricted to Mark III testing in an ambient pressure 
environment. 
 The term ‗One-g‘ in this document refers to any dry, ground-based test. 
4.0 Space Suit Configuration 
The Mark III hardware and ancillary support equipment provides the necessary 
functions and interfaces to conduct manned pressurized suit operations when combined 
with (a) a suitable gas supply system, (b) cooling water supply and (c) suitable 
communication system. 
The Mark III is a one of a kind technology demonstrator, originally designed as a zero-
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pre-breathe suit.  Over time the suit has evolved to include several different 
configurations. The operating pressures of the various configurations range up to 8.3 
psid to provide a crewmember/test subject with the mobile pressure enclosure 
necessary to perform the required activities.  The Mark III uses a rear entry hatch. The 
suit weighs 121 lbs. 
The various Mark III suit pressures are as follows: 
Suit Component Operational 
Pressure Range 
Structural 
Pressure 
Proof 
Pressure 
MAWP 
Lower Torso 
Assembly 
0 – 6.2 (  0.1) psid 
1.5 x specified 
test pressure 
12.6 psid 11.3 psid 
Cast Aluminum HUT 0 – 8.3 (  0.1) psid 16.8 psid 15.1 psid 
Heavy Composite 
HUT 
0 – 6.2 (  0.1) psid 12.6 psid 11.3 psid 
Lightweight 
Composite HUT 
0 – 4.3 (  0.1) psid 8.8 psid 7.9 psid 
The operational pressure range is the range to which the suit can be nominally 
operated for manned testing.  The top end of the nominal operational pressure range 
is equivalent to 1/2 the proof pressure.  Structural pressure is 1.5 times the specified 
test pressure for any given test.  Proof pressure is the maximum unmanned pressure 
to which the suit was tested by the vendor prior to delivery.  The maximum allowable 
working pressure (MAWP) is 90% of the proof pressure.  The pressure systems RVs 
are set to keep components below their MAWPs.  If the suit is pressurized over its 
MAWP, the suit will be taken out of service and an in-depth inspection/review of the 
suit will be performed before the suit is put back in service. 
4.1 Capabilities 
The Mark III and associated support equipment provides the crewmember or test 
subject with the following: 
a) Anthropomorphic pressure enclosure (enclosure includes attachments and 
openings for breathing gas supply system interface). 
b) Liquid cooling circuit (with attachments and openings for liquid cooling supply 
circuit interface). 
c) Communication system interface. 
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4.2 External Interfaces 
The Mark III has three main external interfaces: breathing gas, cooling water and a 
communications system. 
4.2.1 Breathing Gas 
The Mark III is designed to receive certified breathing air at 5 – 6 ACFM (actual 
cubic feet per minute) to both inflate the pressure garment and provide a breathable 
atmosphere for the suit subject.  The breathing air is delivered to the pressure 
garment via a certified gaseous breathing air system.  The air enters the pressure 
garment at the connection located on the top, center of the rear entry hatch (‗Air In‘) 
and is routed into the helmet by the Mark III HUT Vent Duct.  The return air 
(exhalent) is removed from the suit at the ‗Air Out‘ connection located on the top, 
right of the rear entry hatch.  Both the supply and return air connectors are Class III 
Apollo style connectors.  A back-pressure regulator (BPR), with a pressure gauge 
which reads from 0-15 psig, is positioned on the suit breathing air exhaust line and is 
used to adjust suit pressure.   
4.2.2 Cooling Water 
The Mark III receives cooling from an external source, and has a cooling line pass-
thru located on the top, left of the rear entry hatch, which allows the modified shuttle 
liquid cooling garment (LCG) cooling lines to be routed through the fitting.  On the 
inside of the pressure garment, the cooling lines are routed directly to the main LCG 
lines via 0.375‖ PVC tubing fitted with standard self-sealing quick disconnects.   
4.2.3 Communications 
The Mark III contains its own internal communications system to receive and deliver 
audio from and to the suit test team.  The in-suit speakers, attenuator, amplifier box 
and associated wiring are housed behind a protective cover in the hatch.  A hard 
mounted microphone system resides along the suit-side neck ring to provide off-
human communications.  The internal communications set-up also allows for 
connection of an ear-bud.  The internal system connects to one of three external 
communications systems that actually provide the system power and signal 
processing via a Bendix connector on the suit rear hatch.  
The Space Suit Audio Communication Interface System (SPACIS) is the primary 
external comm. interface for space suit testing. The Mark III is approved for use with 
both SPACIS I and II.  Configuration of the SPACIS and associated communication 
hardware is documented in CTSD-ADV-819: Hazard Analysis for Spacesuit Audio 
Communication Interface System. The SPACIS system has a line level speaker 
output and is designed to interact with either the single-channel or four-channel 
amplifiers. The microphone input is designed for 600 Hz electret microphones.  
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Technicians and operators primarily connect to SPACIS utilizing the RSwo-601 belt 
packs. In lab environments, the external speaker can be used to broadcast two-way 
comm. to the entire test team real-time. The suit is connected utilizing a 
communication line that runs underneath the breathing air and cooling umbilical 
sheath. 
The Advanced EVA (AEVA) Communications System is an alternate communication 
system is a wireless cable-free, battery operated portable system that is integrated 
into the Liquid Air Backpack.  This system is used where cable free operations are 
required, such as the rockyard or other remote field locations.  A complete 
description of this system and a specific configuration description can be found in 
CTSD-ADV-563: AEVA Communications System Hazard Analysis Report.  
 
 
Figure 1: Mark III External Interface Locations 
4.3 Physical Description 
The Class III Mark III Suit consists of the following subsystems, which are described 
further, in the following paragraphs:  
 Hard Upper Torso (Rear entry) 
 Arm Assembly  
Water In/Out 
Air In 
Air Out  
Pressure 
Relief 
  
Comm.
. 
CTSD-ADV-590, Rev. B Hazard Analysis for Mark III Space Suit Assembly Used in One-g Standard 
Operations 
 
Date: 8-2-2011 Page 7 of 25 
 
 Lower Torso Assembly  
 Helmet  
 Glove Assembly  
 Ancillary Support Equipment 
4.3.1 Hard Upper Torso (Rear entry): 
The hard upper torso (HUT) consists of the HUT itself, a detachable rear hatch, 
helmet disconnect, and a breech lock design attachment to the lower torso.  It 
utilizes Apollo type inlet/outlet gas connectors, a cooling water connector and an 
Apollo type relief valve. The external interface hardware is located on the upper 
center of the hatch, as shown in Figure 1.  The Mark III HUT Vent Duct is used to 
direct airflow into the helmet. The locking mechanism for securing the hatch to the 
HUT is a breech lock design with the locking lever located in front center just above 
the waist.  A shoulder harness is used in the suit. 
4.3.2 Arm Assembly: 
The left and right arm assemblies are flexible, anthropomorphic pressure vessels of 
heat sealed urethane coated nylon bladder fabric enclosed in polyester restraint 
fabric.  The heat sealed seams in the bladder are over-taped on the inner surface 
with nylon bladder fabric coated on both sides with urethane and attached by heat 
sealing.  Each arm has a bearing at the Scye opening and also between the upper 
and lower arm.  The upper and lower arm is secured together by a 19 1/4‖ long 
Ortman wire. The arm Ortman wire is color coded blue at the exposed end so that it 
is easily identifiable. A wrist disconnect is secured to the lower arm by a 16‖ Ortman 
wire, which is color coded orange. The bladder and restraint fabric are flange 
mounted.  Fully redundant axial primary and secondary restraint line webbings are 
provided to carry the axial loads between the flanges on the lower arm.  The primary 
shoulder used on the Mark III Space Suit is a rolling convolute with link attachments 
for each convolute.  The 4 bearing Air-Lock composite shoulders (operational 
pressure range 0 – 4.3  0.1 psid) can also be used on the Mark III with an adapter.  
A cover layer is provided for each upper and lower arm. 
4.3.3 Lower Torso Assembly: 
The lower torso assembly (LTA) consists of waist, brief, hip/thigh, leg and boot 
assemblies, and has an operational pressure range of 0 – 6.2  0.1 psid. 
Waist assembly: 
The waist consists of a breech lock adapter to mate with the HUT and an optional  
waist bearing.  It has a rolling convolute and pivot points on each side to allow for 
flexion/extension at the waist. The pivot points are attached to a brief. 
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Brief Assembly: 
The brief assembly is a composite piece attached to the waist by the convolute 
fabric and pivot points. It has two leg openings to accommodate the hip/thigh 
assembly. 
Hip/Thigh Assembly: 
The hip/thigh assembly is made of composite material and consists of two 
transition elements joined together by three bearings secured with Ortman wires 
to each other. It is secured to the brief assembly by an Ortman wire. The lower 
bearing incorporates a thigh adduction/abduction joint, and is attached to a 
flange to accommodate the leg assembly. 
Leg Assembly: 
The leg assembly consists of heat-sealed urethane coated nylon bladder and 
Dacron restraint fabric.  The heat sealed seams in the bladder are over-taped to 
the inner surface with nylon bladder fabric coated on both sides with urethane 
and attached to the bladder by heat sealing.  Fully redundant axial primary and 
secondary restraint line webbings attach to the flange mounts on both ends of 
the leg assembly. The leg is secured to the hip/thigh assembly with Ortman 
wires. 
Boot Assembly: 
The Mark III can operate with three different boot assemblies, as described 
below: 
Zero Pre-Breathe Boot 
The Zero Pre-Breathe Boot assembly has the same interior soft-good 
construction as the shuttle boot; however the outer (restraint) layer 
consists of a standard work boot sole and leather upper portion attached 
to a soft ankle convolute.   
David Clark Boot 
The David Clark Boot assembly has a Gore-tex bladder with a 400 denier 
Nomex upper which incorporates patterned convolutes for 
flexion/extension.  The boot assembly has an instep strap for indexing the 
foot and a standard work boot sole. 
Self Adjustable REI Boot 
The Self Adjustable REI Boot assembly is an REI suit boot which has 
been modified to be self adjustable while at pressure.  The boot uses a 
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commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Boa™ device for instep sizing and has 
the option of two different modified COTS booties for indexing the foot 
within the boot.  The boot uses an adapter ring to allow it to interface with 
the Mark III ankle bearing. 
All three boot assemblies connect with either a composite or an aluminum ankle 
bearing, which secure the boot to the leg assembly with a 20 3/8‖ Ortman wire. 
The boot disconnect Ortman wire is color coded white at the exposed end.   
4.3.4 Helmet: 
The Mark III can be configured with two different helmets, a 13 inch or 14 inch 
diameter hemispherical dome.  Both helmets consist of a detachable, transparent 
hard pressure vessel encompassing the head and include the passive disconnect for 
attachment to the HUT with a 42 7/8‖ Ortman wire fitting. 
4.3.5 Glove Assembly: 
The Mark III lower arm-to-glove interface is a Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
(EMU) style suit side wrist disconnect.  The Mark III can be used with approved 
glove configurations which interface with this wrist disconnect.  The gloves used with 
the Mark III shall not be taken above their specified MAWP. 
4.3.6 Ancillary Support Equipment 
Liquid Cooling Garment (LCG): 
A modified SSA LCG is used with the Mark III. It is a conformal garment, which is 
worn whenever the suit is worn.  It has ethylene vinyl acetate tubing, woven 
through the spandex restraint cloth.  Cooling water circulates through the tubing, 
near the skin. 
 
Thermal Comfort Undergarment (TCU): 
The TCU is a two piece (top and bottom) crew optional underclothing.  The TCU 
is worn under the LCG to improve crew comfort and hygiene. 
Polar Heart Rate Monitor/Zepher Bioharness 
The Polar Hearth Rate Monitor may be worn during suited testing to monitor the 
test subject‘s heart rate. 
The Zepher Bioharness may also be worn during suited testing.  The Zephyr 
Bioharness is a sensor strap with a transmitter and data logging memory 
capability used for physiological monitoring. The Zephyr records heart rate, 
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breathing, posture (attitude of device in degrees from vertical), skin temperature, 
and activity and has a transmit range up to 100 m (50 feet), environment and 
antenna dependent.  
Mark III Donning Stand 
The Mark III donning stand secures the suit at the waist front to allow for rear 
entry.  Height adjustment of the stand is motor driven and can be adjusted by the 
suited crewman. Annual loads certification testing is performed to a safe working 
load of 500 lbs (1000 lb proof load test).  The donning stand also consists of the 
donning stairs, which are also load certified to a safe working load of 250 lbs 
(500 lb proof load test).  The stairs lock into the donning, and allow the subject to 
climb up to the rear entry hatch level during donning. 
 
5.0 Applicable Documents 
JPR-1700.1  JSC Safety and Health Handbook 
JSC-17773  Preparing Hazard Analyses for JSC Ground Operations 
STB-BB-121  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the EMU Laboratory  
Pressure Garment Assembly Test Stands 
STB-HA-121 Hazard Analysis for the EMU Laboratory Pressure Garment 
Assembly (PGA) Test Stands 
STB-F-412 Breathing Air Tube Trailer Charging and Sampling 
Procedure 
CTSD-ADV-197 Standard Operating Procedure for the Mark III Space Suit 
Assembly (SSA) Used in One-g Operations 
CTSD-ADV-230 Fit Check Procedure for the Mark III Space Suit Assembly 
(SSA) 
 
CTSD-ADV-298 Mark III Space Suit Assembly Maintenance and Repair 
Manual  
CTSD-ADV-563  AEVA Communications System Hazard Analysis Report 
CTSD-ADV-652 Communications, Avionics, and Informatics Pack and LAB 
Data Acquisition System Hazard Analysis Report 
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CTSD-ADV-801 Integrated Hazard Analysis for Use of the B34 Portable 
Cooling Box (PCB) Used in 1-G and Reduced Gravity 
Aircraft Evaluations with Prototype Space Suits 
CTSD-ADV-818 Determination of Residual Carbon Dioxide During Forced 
Ventilation of a Hemispherical Space Suit Helmet 
CTSD-ADV-819 Hazard Analysis for the Space Suit Audio Communication 
Interface System (SPACIS) 
CTSD-ADV-822 Building 34 Structural Test of CEI Using PGA Test Stand 
CTSD-ADV-823 Building 34 Leakage Test of CEI/TARE of the PGA Test 
Stand 
CTSD-ADV-824 Building 34 Ground Cooling Cart Checkout and Operating 
Procedure 
CTSD-ADV-869 Integrated Hazard Analysis for the Advanced Suit Hardware 
and the Building 34 PGA Test Stand 
CTSD-ADV-907 Integrated Hazard Analysis for the Advanced Suit Hardware 
and the Building 34 LPO K-Bottle Manifold 
L16-M00001 PGA/GSL Test Stand Hardware Fixtures 
L20-M00002 Ground Support Equipment Test Support Hardware 
Integration Drawing 
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6.0 Summary of Hazards 
6.1 Hazard Identification Criteria 
This report is prepared in accordance with JSC17773, "Preparing Hazard Analyses for 
JSC Ground Operation".  The ―hazards‖ or "potential hazards" identified in this analysis 
came from the following sources: 
Facility ―walk-through‖ inspection 
Hardware inspection 
System Design Drawings 
Discussion with Facility/SSA Engineers and Technicians 
Each potential hazard identified from these criteria is documented on the attached 
Hazard Analysis Worksheets.  Each work sheet identifies a potential hazard, lists what 
causes that hazard to exist and states what measures have been taken to control or 
minimize that hazard.  It gives a numerical representation of what level or degree of 
severity the hazard is rated by the analyzer and also lists the probability of the 
occurrence before and after mitigation.    
The following definitions are vital to an understanding of the requirements contained in 
this document: 
a. Hazard — An unsafe or unhealthful condition that could lead to a mishap if it is 
not corrected. 
b. Consequence — The subjective estimate of worst credible outcome in terms of 
potential personnel injury, equipment/facility damage, and monetary losses.  
Consequence severity classes are defined as follows.  
Class I - Catastrophic. 
A condition that may cause death or permanently disabling injury, facility 
destruction on the ground, or loss of crew, major systems, or vehicle 
during the mission; schedule slippage causing launch window to be 
missed; cost overrun greater than 50% of planned cost.  
Class II - Critical.  
A condition that may cause severe injury or occupational illness, or major 
property damage to facilities, systems, equipment, or flight hardware; 
schedule slippage causing launch date to be missed; cost overrun 
between 15% and not exceeding 50% of planned cost.  
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Class III - Moderate.  
A condition that may cause minor injury or occupational illness, or minor 
property damage to facilities, systems, equipment, or flight hardware; 
internal schedule slip that does not impact launch date; cost overrun 
between 2% and not exceeding 15% of planned cost.  
Class IV - Negligible.  
A condition that could cause the need for minor first-aid treatment but 
would not adversely affect personal safety or health; damage to facilities, 
equipment, or flight hardware more than normal wear and tear level; 
internal schedule slip that does not impact internal development 
milestones; cost overrun less than 2% of planned cost.  
c. Likelihood — The relative likelihood a hazard may occur.  The complete 
likelihood range is separated into intervals for additional classification.  It is 
important to note that even though quantitative probability intervals are listed in 
this document they are only for numeric comparison and that the actual 
probability or likelihood is derived by subjective estimations of a qualitative 
nature.  The hazard likelihood categories are defined as follows. 
Likelihood A – Likely to occur – (e.g., 1.0 ≥ Probability > 0.1)  
Likelihood B – Probably will occur – (e.g., 0.1 ≥ Probability > 0.01)  
Likelihood C – May occur – (e.g., 0.01 ≥ Probability > 0.001)  
Likelihood D – Unlikely to occur – (e.g., 0.001 ≥ Probability > 0.000001)  
Likelihood E – Improbable – (e.g., 0.000001 ≥ Probability)  
d. Risk Assessment Code (RAC) — The risk assessment code is the numerical 
value that represents the hazard risk associated with a given task, project, test, 
or equipment and is the point of intersection of the consequence severity 
estimate and the likelihood estimate on the RAC matrix.  
e. Risk Assessment Code (RAC) Matrix — A matrix made up of likelihood 
estimates, consequence severity estimates and risk assessment codes.  The 
matrix is used to derive the risk assessment code once the consequence and 
likelihood have been determined. 
f. Hazard Disposition — The status of a hazard after controls are in place.  Hazard 
Dispositions are utilized in this analysis, documented at the bottom of each 
hazard analysis worksheet, to supplement the risk assessment codes and to 
further describe the control or status of the hazard. The disposition criteria are 
defined as follows: 
Open/no action —  A hazard exists in the system, and no controlling 
equipment or procedures have been implemented to minimize the hazard. 
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Closed/controlled —  A hazard exists in the system, and appropriate 
mechanical/electrical/procedural actions have been taken to reduce the 
hazard to a minimal level. 
Closed/eliminated — A hazard that is no longer in the system because it 
has been eliminated. 
Closed/accepted — A hazard of RAC 2 or 3 after controls whose risk has 
been accepted by NASA management. 
g. Hazard Summary — A list of the hazard categories/titles with before and after 
control RAC‘s. 
h. Verification — The validation method or process that confirms the hazard control.  
Verifications of the hazard controls are identified via review of test procedures, 
equipment operating instructions and check lists, test system drawings and 
schematics, personnel training records, applicable JSC, EA, Division, and Branch 
work instructions and operating procedures, inspection of test equipment/area 
and interviews with facility engineers, technicians, test directors, and 
management.  
i. Hazard Analysis Worksheet (HAW) — Tables in the hazard analysis used to 
document specific information regarding each hazard or hazard category, such 
as hazard title/description/consequence, system, sub-system, RAC, hazard 
causes, controls, verifications, remarks, and hazard disposition.   There is only 
one hazard category/title per HAW. 
j. The RAC matrix is defined as follows: 
Table 1 – Risk Assessment Code Matrix 
CONSEQUENCE    
CLASS 
LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE 
A B C D E 
I 1 1 2 3 4 
II 1 2 3 4 5 
III 2 3 4 5 6 
IV 3 4 5 6 7 
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k. The table below specifies the required action(s) for each RAC. 
Table 2 - RAC Action Table 
RAC Action 
1 
Unacceptable – All operations must cease immediately until the 
hazard is corrected or until temporary controls are in place and 
permanent controls are in work. A safety or health professional 
must stay at the scene at least until temporary controls are in 
place. 
RAC 1 hazards have the highest priority for hazard controls. 
2 
Undesirable – All operations must cease immediately until the 
hazard is corrected or until temporary controls are in place and 
permanent controls are in work. 
RAC 2 hazards are next in priority after RAC 1 hazards for 
control. 
Program Manager (Directorate level), Organizational Director, or 
equivalent management is authorized to accept the risk with 
adequate justification 
3 
Acceptable with controls – Division Chief or equivalent 
management is authorized to accept the risk with adequate 
justification 
4-7 
Acceptable with controls – Branch Chief or equivalent 
management is authorized to accept the risk with adequate 
justification 
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6.2 Hazard Summary 
This Hazard Analysis addresses potential hazards associated with the facilities and test 
operations of the Mark III used in standard, manned, one-g evaluations.    Below is the 
hazard summary list the manned use of the Mark III. 
This Hazard Analysis was written to specifically address hazards associated with Mark 
III Standard One-g Operations, and therefore, calls out the ―Standard Operating 
Procedure for the Mark III SSA Used in One-g Operations‖ (CTSD-ADV-197) many 
times in the hazard control verifications.  All procedural controls which exist in CTSD-
ADV-197 are duplicated in the ―Fit Check Procedure for the Mark III SSA‖ (CTSD-ADV-
230), making it possible for CTSD-ADV-230 to act as a stand-alone procedure for Mark 
III fit checks.  Should this HA or any steps in CTSD-ADV-197 be altered, a review of 
CTSD-ADV-230 is also required. 
 Potential Hazards    Severity/Probability/RAC   
       Before Controls   After Controls 
1. Rapid Suit Depressurization II/B/2 II/D/4 
2. Excessive Pulmonary Pressure II/C/3 II/D4 
3. Excessive Inner Ear Pressure II/B/2 II/D/4 
4. Improper Suit Fit III/B/3 III/D/5 
5. Improper Thermal Regulation II/B/2 II/D/4 
6. Loss of Breathable I/B/1 I/E/4 
Atmosphere 
7.  
8.  
9.  
 
10.  
11. Facility Emergency I/B/1 I/E/4 
12. Slips, Trips, Falls III/A/2 III/D/5 
13. Muscle Cramps or Exhaustion III/A/2 III/D/5 
14. Subject Entrapment II/B/2 II/E/5 
15. Hyperventilation III/B/3 III/D/5 
16. Loss of Two-way Verbal Comm. III/B/3 III/D/5 
17. Sharp Edges III/B/3 III/D/5 
   Injury from donning stand failure III/B/3 III/D/5
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Nr. Hazard Cause Effect RAC 
Before 
Controls 
Controls Verification RAC 
After 
Controls 
 
1 
 
Rapid Suit 
Depressurization 
 
Structural failure 
caused by 
defective hardware 
(seal, seam ,etc.) 
 
Ear or sinus 
blockage 
 
Arterial Gas 
Embolism 
 
Hardware 
Damage 
 
II/B/2 
 
Prior to each test, suit is 
taken to structural 
pressure, visually 
inspected, and tested for 
leakage to verify 
pressure integrity 
 
Maintenance log is 
reviewed for open items 
which are constraint to 
test prior to each test. 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section I, Part B 
mandates functional 
checkout and 
structural and 
leakage tests 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section I, Part A 
contains step to 
verify no open 
maintenance items. 
 
II/D/4 
 
Structural failure 
caused by 
overpressurization 
 
Calibration of all in-line 
relief valves are verified 
prior to test 
 
 
Per CTSD-ADV-822, 
Section II, Part B, all 
RV calibration dates 
are recorded on the 
test data sheet 
 
Test stand operator 
error 
 
Technicians operating 
test stand are certified 
for that position. 
 
 
Technician 
certification letters 
on file with EC and 
in the Advanced Suit 
Lab. 
 
Lock-locks no fully 
engaged at 
disconnects 
 
Engagement of lock-
locks verified prior to 
pressurization. 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part D 
and H verify all 
connections secure. 
 
2 
 
Excessive 
Pulmonary 
 
Breath holding 
during suit 
 
Respiratory 
trauma 
 
II/C/3 
 
Subject reminded not to 
hold breath 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part G 
 
II/D/4 
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Nr. Hazard Cause Effect RAC 
Before 
Controls 
Controls Verification RAC 
After 
Controls 
Pressure depressurization outlines test subject 
safety brief 
 
3 
 
Excessive Inner 
Ear Pressure 
 
Inappropriate (too 
little or excessive) 
use of Valsalva 
maneuver 
 
Ear trauma, loss 
of equilibrium 
 
II/B/2 
 
Test subject is briefed on 
barotraumas and 
excessive use of 
Valsalva associated with 
suit test 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part G 
outlines test subject 
safety brief 
 
II/D/4 
 
4 
 
Improper Suit Fit 
 
Use of improperly 
sized equipment 
 
Discomfort 
 
Reduced 
mobility 
 
Bruising,  
abrasion 
 
III/B/3 
 
Test subjects are 
required to have a 
successful fit-check prior 
to test participation 
 
Mark III Use Log 
requires date of fit-
check to be 
recorded prior to test 
 
III/D/5 
 
Individual sizing records 
are used to build up suits 
prior to test 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section I, Part A 
verifies suit is sized 
according to record 
 
Certified suit engineers 
have been trained in 
sizing philosophy. 
 
Suit Engineer 
Certifications on file 
in EC and B34 
 
5 
 
Improper 
Thermal 
Regulation 
 
Failure of cooling 
unit 
 
 
Test subject 
discomfort 
 
Reduced 
capacity to work 
 
II/B/2 
 
Function of cooling unit 
verified prior to test 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part E 
verifies function of 
cooling system 
 
II/D/4 
 
Failure of cooling 
garment lines 
 
LCG leak checked prior 
to test 
 
CTSD-ADV-862, 
Section II, Part H 
verifies no leaks 
after connecting 
cooling system to 
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Nr. Hazard Cause Effect RAC 
Before 
Controls 
Controls Verification RAC 
After 
Controls 
LCG. 
 
Subject does not 
request changes to 
cooling level 
 
 
Test subjects reminded 
to request cooling 
adjustments 
 
Suit team trained to 
recognize signs of poor 
thermal management 
 
CTSD-ADV-862, 
Section II, Part G 
outlines test subject 
safety brief 
 
Certification letters 
on file in EC and in 
B34 
 
6 
 
Loss of 
Breathable 
Atmosphere 
 
Reduction of air 
flow due to failure 
of breathing air 
supply system 
 
 
Test subject 
suffocation 
 
Hypercapnia 
 
I/B/1 
 
Airflow is verified prior to 
installing helmet and 
monitored throughout 
test at the air source 
 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part H, 
verifies air flow 
initiated, Part G 
defines test 
termination criteria 
specific to air flow 
rates 
 
I/E/4 
 
Reduction of air 
flow due to 
blockage in air inlet 
line 
 
Test subject informed to 
notify suit engineer if 
they hear a change in 
airflow 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part G 
test subject safety 
briefing 
 
Reduction of air 
flow due to 
operator error 
 
Only certified technicians 
operate air systems 
 
Technician training 
certification letters 
on file in EC and 
B34 
 
Contaminated 
breathing source 
 
Air supplies are sampled 
to verify constituent 
gases and cleanliness 
 
STB-F-412 followed 
for sampling. 
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Nr. Hazard Cause Effect RAC 
Before 
Controls 
Controls Verification RAC 
After 
Controls 
 
Insufficient CO2 
washout in the oral-
nasal area 
 
Many years of historical 
test data with no 
evidence of insufficient 
CO2 washout 
 
Test is terminated if suit 
air flow drops below 5 
ACFM for more than 5 
minutes, or below 4 
ACFM for any period of 
time. 
 
9 yrs Desert RATS 
testing using LAB, 
Walk Back Testing 
 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part G 
test termination 
criteria and subject 
safety briefing. 
 
7 
 
Aspiration of 
Vomit 
 
 
Subject vomits in 
suit 
 
Test subject 
suffocation or 
serious injury 
 
 
I/C/2 
 
Test subject informed of 
hazards associated with 
vomit in the suit and 
instructed on response 
to nausea 
 
Suit team trained to 
respond quickly to vomit 
in suit 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part G 
outlines test subject 
safety brief 
 
 
Certification letters 
on file in EC and in 
B34 
 
I/E/4 
 
8 
 
 
Electric Shock 
 
Short in external 
cooling system 
 
 
Test subject 
injury 
 
III/A/2 
 
System plugged into 
GFCI outlet or power 
cord 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part E 
mandates use of 
GFCI connection 
 
III/D/5 
 
Exposed 
communications 
system wiring in the 
suit 
 
Wires are visually 
inspected prior to each 
test 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section I, Part A 
verifies wires are 
acceptable for use 
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Nr. Hazard Cause Effect RAC 
Before 
Controls 
Controls Verification RAC 
After 
Controls 
9 
 
Contact with or 
Inhalation of 
Toxic Substance 
 
Use of unapproved 
materials or 
lubricants for 
maintenance 
Personnel Injury 
 
Hardware 
damage 
II/A/1 Maintenance manual 
documents approved 
procedures and 
materials for suit 
maintenance 
CTSD-ADV-298, 
Mark III 
Maintenance Manual 
II/E/5 
 
Subject introduces 
contaminants on 
clothing 
Test subjects provided 
with  protective booties 
to wear over socks prior 
to donning suit 
 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part F 
provides booties in 
the ancillary set 
 
Materials placed in 
closed volume of 
suit offgas toxic 
substance 
 
Items in suit have been 
approved for use by 
similarity to EMU flight 
hardware 
 
Vendor supplied 
materials usage 
memo. 
 
10 
 
Fire in Suit 
 
 
Ignition source or 
non-compatible 
materials in suit 
 
 
Personnel injury 
 
Hardware 
damage 
 
I/A/1 
 
Certified breathing air is 
used for sea level tests – 
100% O2 is not allowed 
 
System cleanliness and 
contamination control 
maintained. 
 
 
 
Communication System 
Wires are visually 
inspected prior to each 
test 
 
 
STB-F-412 verifies 
constituent gasses 
in air source         
       
Sampling and Class 
I certification dates 
recorded on Test 
Data Sheet prior to 
each test. 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section I, Part A 
verifies wires are 
acceptable for use 
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Nr. Hazard Cause Effect RAC 
Before 
Controls 
Controls Verification RAC 
After 
Controls 
 
11 
 
 
Facility 
Emergency 
 
 
Loss of power, fire 
or severe weather 
event 
 
 
Personnel injury 
 
Hardware 
damage 
 
I/B/1 
 
Technicians and 
engineers trained to 
respond to facility 
emergencies 
 
Test subjects briefed on 
emergency response 
prior to test 
 
 
Certification letters 
on file in EC and in 
B34 
 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part G 
outlines the test 
subject safety 
briefing 
 
 
I/E/4 
 
12 
 
 
Slips, trips, falls 
 
Wet or slippery 
surfaces 
 
 
Personnel injury 
 
Hardware 
damage 
 
III/A/2 
 
Technicians continually 
watch for and remove 
water from cooling 
system condensation 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part F 
identifies need to 
wipe up excess 
water from cooling 
system 
 
III/D/5 
 
Obstructions in 
work area 
 
 
Items that cannot be 
removed from test area 
are identified during 
safety briefing 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part G 
outlines the test 
subject safety 
briefing 
 
Entangled in 
consumable 
umbilicals 
 
Technicians mind 
umbilicals throughout 
test 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part H 
reminds techs to 
handle the umbilical 
 
13 
 
 
Muscle cramps 
or exhaustion 
 
Overexertion by 
suited subject 
 
Personnel injury 
 
III/A/2 
 
Subject can stop 
participation at any time. 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part G 
 
III/D/5 
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Nr. Hazard Cause Effect RAC 
Before 
Controls 
Controls Verification RAC 
After 
Controls 
   
 
 
 
Test personnel monitor 
test subject for signs of 
overexertion during all 
suited activities. 
outlines the test 
subject safety 
briefing 
 
Certification letters 
on file in EC and 
B34 
 
Dehydration 
 
 
Subjects are asked if 
they are properly 
hydrated prior to test. 
 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part G 
outlines the test 
subject safety 
briefing 
 
14 
 
Subject 
Entrapment 
 
Rear hatch or body 
seal closure 
jammed 
 
Equipment 
damage 
 
III/B/2 
 
Smooth operation of 
both closures verified 
during pre-test functional 
check-out 
 
 
 Subjects can egress 
through either rear hatch 
or body seal closure; 
alternate egress path 
available. 
 
Scenario is reviewed 
during annual 
emergency event 
training 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section I, Part B 
ensures all closures 
operational 
 
 
Visual inspection of 
suit. 
 
 
 
 
Certification letters 
on file in EC and 
B34 
 
III/E/5 
 
15 
 
Hyperventilation 
 
Subject anxiety or 
 
Personnel injury 
 
III/B/3 
 
Subjects are briefed on 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
 
III/D/5 
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Before 
Controls 
Controls Verification RAC 
After 
Controls 
overexertion suit hazards prior to test 
and informed they may 
stop the test at any time 
 
 
Suit engineers trained to 
recognize signs of 
anxiety and over-
exertion and may stop 
the test at any time 
Section II, Part G 
outlines the test 
subject safety 
briefing 
 
STE certification 
letters on file in EC5 
and B34 
 
16 
 
Loss of two-way 
verbal 
communications 
 
 
Component failure 
(wires 
disconnected, 
short, loss of 
power) 
 
 
Personnel injury 
 
III/B/3 
 
Comm. system functions 
verified prior to test. 
 
 
 
 
Condition of wires 
verified prior to test 
 
 
 
Subjects are briefed on 
termination criteria 
associated with loss of 
comm. and alternate 
comm. modes in the 
event of comm. loss 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part C 
verifies 
communications 
system functional 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section I, Part A 
verifies wires are 
acceptable for use 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section II, Part G 
outlines the test 
termination criteria 
and verifies hand 
signals are 
understood by 
subject and suit 
team 
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Improper SPACIS 
configuration 
 
 
Suit team trained to 
operate SPACIS 
 
Engineer and tech 
certification letters 
on file in EC and 
B34 
 
Configuration cheat 
sheet posted on 
SPACIS stand. 
 
17 
 
Sharp Edges or 
Protrusions 
 
Worn hardware 
from use and 
maintenance 
 
 
Personnel injury 
 
III/B/3 
 
Suit hardware is 
inspected prior to use to 
verify assemblies are 
free of sharp edges.  
Any worn screws or 
potentially sharp edges 
are repaired or replaced 
prior to use. 
Maintenance log is 
reviewed for open items 
which are constraint to 
test prior to each test. 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section 1, Part A 
and Section II, Part 
F inspect for sharp 
edges prior to test. 
 
 
 
CTSD-ADV-197, 
Section I, Part A 
contains step to 
verify no open 
maintenance items. 
 
III/D/5 
 
18 
 
Injury from 
donning stand 
 
Donning stand 
failure 
 
Personnel injury 
 
III/B/3 
 
Donning stand and stairs 
are load certified 
annually. 
 
Load certification tag 
on donning stand. 
 
III/D/5 
 
